Florida’s proceedings supplementary statute, section 56.29, Florida Statutes, provides judgment creditors with a powerful post-judgment mechanism to uncover and reach assets of a judgment debtor that have been concealed, transferred, or placed in the hands of third parties. Florida courts treat the statute as an equitable tool designed to prevent a debtor’s “ingenuity in placing property beyond reach” from rendering a judgment meaningless.
Yet when creditors seek to employ this Florida procedure in federal court, serious jurisdictional limits arise. The Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in Casa Express Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, No. 24-11642, __ F.4th __, 2025 WL 3022357 (11th Cir. Oct. 29 2025), illustrates the boundary between legitimate execution proceedings and impermissible efforts to impose new liability on third parties.
The Florida Framework under § 56.29
Proceedings supplementary are codified in Fla. Stat. § 56.29 and are equitable in nature, intended to subject property of the judgment debtor in the hands of third parties to execution. Zureikat v. Shaibani, 944 So. 2d 1019, 1022 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). They provide a summary means of reaching property which cannot be taken on execution but which may be used to satisfy a judgment. Rashdan v. Sheikh, 706 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
Under subsection (3)(b) of the statute, a court may void any “gift, transfer, assignment or other conveyance” made or contrived by the judgment debtor to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors. § 56.29(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2024). This provision allows a creditor to implead third parties who hold or have received the debtor’s assets and to obtain relief akin to that in an independent creditor’s bill. SeePollizzi v. Paulshock, 52 So. 3d 786, 788–89 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (recognizing that § 56.29 permits avoidance of fraudulent transfers made to hinder creditors);Longo v. Associated Limousine Servs., Inc., 236 So. 3d 1115, 1118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (affirming an order voiding a transfer under § 56.29).
Florida’s circuit courts therefore possess broad equitable authority to bring within reach of execution any asset that equitably belongs to the judgment debtor, even when held by a non-party transferee. This flexibility is a distinctive feature of Florida’s enforcement regime and contrasts sharply with the jurisdictional limits applicable in federal courts.
Federal Enforcement Under Rule 69(a): Ancillary Jurisdiction Constraints
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) directs that money judgments be enforced by a writ of execution and that “the procedure on execution…must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located.” Although Rule 69(a) allows the use of Florida’s § 56.29 framework, federal courts may do so only within the confines of their limited ancillary jurisdiction.
Peacock and Straub: Foundational Precedent
In Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996), the Supreme Court held that federal courts lack ancillary jurisdiction “in a subsequent lawsuit to impose an obligation to pay an existing federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment.” Id. at 357. The Court distinguished between permissible enforcement (e.g., garnishment or attachment of a debtor’s assets) and impermissible efforts to create new liability against third parties based on new facts or theories.
The Eleventh Circuit refined that line in National Maritime Services, Inc. v. Straub, 776 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2015), where it upheld ancillary jurisdiction over a federal supplementary proceeding brought under § 56.29 to void a fraudulent transfer. There, the creditor sought to disgorge assets transferred by the debtor to an insider, not to impose independent liability. The court emphasized that ancillary jurisdiction exists only when the proceeding merely aids execution of the existing judgment but ancillary jurisdiction does not extend to a new lawsuit to impose liability for a judgment on a third party. Id. at 787.
Casa Express v. Venezuela: Clarifying the Limit
In Casa Express Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, No. 24-11642, __ F.4th __, 2025 WL 3022357 (11th Cir. Oct. 29 2025), the Eleventh Circuit confronted a creditor’s attempt to execute on Florida real properties allegedly purchased by third parties with funds traceable to a Venezuelan bribery scheme. The judgment creditor sought to impose a constructive trust on those properties under § 56.29, claiming they “belonged” to Venezuela.
The court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the proceeding was not in aid of execution but an entirely new lawsuit. The creditor’s constructive-trust theory required proving new facts—the bribery scheme—and sought to impose liability on non-debtors never bound by the original bond judgment. The panel concluded that supplementary proceedings in federal court cannot be used as a vehicle for asserting new claims of liability. Id. at 27 (citing Peacock and Straub).
Thus, Casa Express confirms that federal courts applying Florida’s § 56.29 must ensure the proceeding is truly ancillary—designed only to reach the judgment debtor’s property, not to shift the judgment itself to new parties or to litigate unrelated misconduct.
Comparing the Frameworks
Florida circuit courts possess broad equitable authority under § 56.29 to implead third parties, void fraudulent transfers, and apply assets to satisfy a judgment. Florida’s state courts may determine ownership and fraudulent-transfer issues even when requiring new factual findings about the debtor’s intent. See Zureikat, Pollizzi, Longo, and § 56.29(3)(b).
On the other hand, federal district courts under Rule 69 and ancillary jurisdiction analysis, possess only narrow ancillary jurisdiction to enforce existing judgments; may not impose new liability on non-debtors. Federal courts may adjudicate only matters “necessary to effectuate the decree,” not new factual or legal theories unrelated to the original judgment. See Peacock, Straub, and Casa Express.
Practical Implications
A judgment creditor seeking to pursue assets through Florida’s proceedings supplementary should proceed in state court whenever possible, where the statutory mechanism has full equitable scope. If the judgment is registered in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1963, the creditor may use § 56.29 procedures only to recover the debtor’s own assets—not to assert constructive-trust, veil-piercing, or similar theories against new parties. Fraudulent-transfer proceedings remain ancillary because they target property previously held by the judgment debtor. Constructive-trust or unjust-enrichment theories founded on unrelated facts generally fall outside federal jurisdiction.
Conclusion
Florida’s § 56.29 provides a robust statutory frameworks for post-judgment discovery and enforcement. But when judgment creditors invoke that mechanism in federal court, Peacock, Straub, and Casa Express draw a bright jurisdictional line: federal supplementary proceedings may enforce an existing judgment against the debtor’s assets, but they may not create new liability or litigate new factual theories against non-parties.
For creditors, the lesson is clear—when pursuing complex asset-recovery or fraudulent-transfer relief, state court generally offers the broader jurisdictional reach, while federal court remains a narrower enforcement forum bound by Article III and the limits of ancillary jurisdiction.
